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nonfederal hydroelectric facilities is examined. Hydropower licensing reforms by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission to better weigh market and nonmarket tradeoffs did not require 
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Many environmental economists advocate calculating and then including money-
equivalent measurement of peoples’ preferences for nonmarket environmental amenities in a 
comprehensive benefit-cost analysis. These benefit-cost results have long been proposed as a 
guide for public investment and regulatory decisions (Arrow et al 1996).  Supporters of these 
efforts assert that such monetization will be welcomed and used by decision-participants who 
seek to understand peoples’ preferences for important environmental services. This assertion 
provides part of the motivation for a major research program to develop procedures and data 
bases for “nonmarket valuation” (Cropper 2000). Some economists question the conceptual and 
philosophic validity of a benefit-cost criterion for policy evaluation (Bromley 2006, 2003; Sagoff 
2004; Shabman and Stephenson 2000).  Less systematic attention has been given to the question: 
“is nonmarket valuation demanded or used for decision-making?”  We address this question in 
the specific context of hydropower dam licensing by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC).  
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is responsible for issuing licenses 
to operate all nonfederal hydropower projects in the United States.  FERC licenses these 
facilities for 30 to 50 years and also “relicenses” the same facilities when the initial license 
expires.  License conditions typically include downstream flow release requirements (timing, 
magnitude, and duration of flow) that will constrain electric power production potential and 
influence downstream riverine conditions, but can also include fish passage requirements, recreational enhancements (recreational facilities, public access to water, etc), and resource 
enhancements (ex. fish stocking programs) that can increase the costs of dam modifications and 
operations. In setting license conditions, Congress instructs FERC to balance competing uses for 
the water resources (Federal Power Act, Section 10a).  This “balancing” directive requires FERC 
to recognize the tradeoffs between the marketed service of hydro-electric power and the 
nonmarket services of recreation and aquatic life support (fish population).  In fact, the Federal 
Power Act’s hydropower licensing process represents one of the few instances in U.S. 
environmental law where a public agency is explicitly directed to do make such tradeoffs that 
involve environmental services.  Most environmental statutes, such as Clean Water Act, Clean 
Air Act, and Endangered Species Act, explicitly prohibit an explicit economic weighing of costs 
and benefits when deciding levels of environmental services to be provided.  As a result this 
process offers one of the few clear opportunities for nonmarket valuation estimates to be 
developed and used in making choices in environmental decision making. 
Until recently, the FERC relicensing decision-process was highly centralized and FERC 
commissioners assumed primary responsibility for deciding tradeoffs between the value of 
hydropower production and environmental services (Spence 1999).  Furthermore, FERC rarely if 
ever, asked for money-equivalent estimates of public preferences (non-market valuation) for 
recreational or environmental outcomes.  Instead, FERC compared estimates of hydropower 
costs and revenues with a variety of qualitative and quantitative measures of the physical and 
biological changes of different license alternatives (Moore et al 2001; Stephenson and Shabman 
2001).  
 However, beginning in the mid-1980s and gathering momentum in the 1990s, this FERC 
licensing process came under public criticism for perceived inadequacies when considering alterations to biological resources and recreational uses in rivers affected by hydropower 
operations (Stephenson 2000; Spence 1999).  This criticism manifested itself in increasingly 
lengthy and contentious licensing process, leading to calls for reform from nearly every 
interested party.  Some economists argued that increased use of nonmarket valuation could guide 
FERC decision making when making tradeoffs and in so doing reduce the increasing tension and 
delay that had become endemic to the relicensing process (Moore et al. 2001; Loomis and 
Feldman 1995).  
In response to the widespread criticism and dissatisfaction with the process, FERC 
instituted a series of licensing reforms starting in 1997 and through 2005 period FERC made 
significant institutional changes to address the perceived inadequacies in the way it met its 
statutory balancing requirement.  We first provide a historical review to set the stage for the 
debate over the possible role for nonmarket valuation in a revised licensing process.  During this 
time FERC had the opportunity to revise licensing procedures or guidelines that would 
encourage or require the use of nonmarket valuation as an aid to its deliberations.  However, it 
did not make such changes.  Then we report on the role nonmarket valuation now plays in 
deciding the balance between hydropower and environmental services under the new licensing 
rules.  While nonmarket valuation is permissible, there is little empirical evidence that decision 
participants on individual relicensing cases either demanded or used nonmarket valuation when 
making licensing decisions.  We conclude that the new FERC licensing process stressing 
negotiation between various interests is a workable, and perhaps, preferable, substitute for 
nonmarket valuation as a way to meet FERC’s statutory balancing requirement.  
II. NONMARKET VALUATION IN FERC HYDROPOWER RELICENSING  
 
The Traditional Process  
FERC was formed with the passage of the Federal Power Act in 1920 as an independent 
commission.
1  The Commissioners were appointed by the President on staggered terms and were 
served by a staff of experts from the disciplines required for the commissioners to execute their 
responsibilities. As an independent commission, the FERC was to determine the public interest 
in dam licensing decisions based on the results from necessary technical studies. Even by 
standards of the day, the FERC was designed to be better insulated from public pressure than 
most water resource agencies.
2  With a few exceptions, Congress granted the FERC broad 
authority to decide whether a dam would be constructed and the conditions under which the dam 
should operate.  According to one observer, “for more than 60 years the FPA (i.e. FERC) has 
been the prototypical example of the unconstrained delegation of power to unelected 
bureaucrats” (Spence 1999a, 420).  
FERC required license applicants to follow a formal licensing process that would provide 
the FERC commissioners with the information they deemed necessary for making a decision that 
would serve the public interest. Prior to the recent reforms, FERC’s “traditional” licensing 
process could be described as applicant driven and sequential.  In general the licensing process is 
divided into two parts: pre-filing and post-filing (license) phase.  In the pre-filing phase, the 
licensee notifies interested parties on an intent to file for a license (or relicense) and take 
comments on study needs.  The applicant selects and funds analytical studies. Based on another 
set of comments from state and federal resource agencies, the applicant submits a draft license 
                                                 
1 Originally, FERC was called the Federal Power Commission (FPA).  
2 This statutory delegation of authority to the FERC was consistent with the progressive-era ideal delegating 
resource allocation and decisions to expert agencies.  application to FERC. The draft application includes the license conditions recommended by the 
licensee.   The post-filing phase begins when FERC accepts the application for review.  Initially, 
FERC judges whether the application is complete.  If not, FERC will require that additional 
studies be conducted (funded by the applicant).  When the applicant is judged to be complete, 
FERC officially accepts the application and begins the formal evaluation process.  The process, 
conducted under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) guidelines, formally recognizes 
all participants (federal and state agencies, environmental groups, Native American Tribes, etc) 
who wish to review and comment on the application.  FERC accepts and reviews license 
proposals from these groups and may issue request for additional studies.  FERC may also 
develop license alternatives of its own.    
  Based on this process, FERC would evaluate and select among a number of license 
alternatives, including the preferred alternative of the applicant. FERC is not required to, and 
would not, compare license alternatives based on formal social benefit cost analysis.  In 
evaluating a typical relicensing case, the analytical baseline is the operations and resulting levels 
of services under the existing license.  FERC then typically calculates the financial costs (capital 
and annual operating and maintenance costs) to the license applicant of alternatives to the 
existing license.  Costs also include foregone power benefits of any required change in 
operations from the existing license (typically measured as the cost for replacing lost 
hydropower production with the next best available alternative).   
In most relicensing cases, the majority of analytical attention and resources were directed 
toward the means, costs, and consequences of mitigating environmental conditions from 
operating the facility. Such measures might include establishing downstream flow releases, 
reservoir levels, fish screen/entrainment, fish passage facilities, recreational enhancements, and environmental enhancements (riparian buffers, wetlands).  The FERC staff calculated the 
reduction in the net financial position of the licensee (e.g. increased costs from the construction 
costs of a fish passage facility or reduced power revenues due to increasing minimum instream 
flows) for different mitigation options.  
The cost to the licensee of different mitigation options was then compared to different 
measures of environmental change. Specifically, the cost of replacement power and project 
modification costs are compared against typically a suite of indicators that measure the changes 
to the natural environment. These indicators might include changes in fish populations, acres of 
usable aquatic habitat, and increased number of recreational user days.  These trade-offs were 
sometimes analyzed using incremental (knee-of-the curve) analyses.  For example, such analyses 
might compare the incremental gains in usable fish habitat with the changes in the sum of the 
financial and power replacement costs as different minimum instream flows were required 
(Fargo 1991). 
  Some environmental indicators might be expressed in monetary terms, for example as 
the replacement cost through hatchery production of juvenile fish lost to entrainment. Research 
on FERC decision-making, however, consistently reports an almost complete absence of 
willingness to pay estimates for establishing environmental mitigation measures (Moore et al 
2001; Loomis and Feldman 1995; Stephenson and Shabman 2001).  Moore et al (2001, 424) 
state:  
One result is clear from examination of the record: FERC does not explicitly 
weigh the social benefits and costs of relicensing decisions. It regularly considers 
only private hydropower revenues and costs in its decisions. The opportunity costs of hydropower operations – in terms of the benefits of whitewater recreation 
and sport fishing – are rarely quantified in the sample of licenses studied here.  
 
While Moore et al. consider that explicit weighing means only monetized estimates of all 
changes in environmental and economic services, this does not also imply that FERC did not 
weigh tradeoffs or consider the opportunity cost of hydropower operations.  FERC 
commissioners (and the staff that make recommendations) do weigh tradeoffs, but historically it 
was based on FERC’s collective judgment of whether the mitigation option is “worth” the 
financial cost to the licensee and was not based on an analytical calculation.   
Pressures for Reform  
Almost since its inception, environmental and recreational interests have charged that 
FERC placed too much weight on hydropower interests in licensing and relicensing decisions 
(Spence 1999b).  This criticism began to more vocal and persistent beginning in the 1960s and 
gathered further momentum as the river restoration movement emerged two decades later.  Partly 
in response to this mounting criticism, the FERC has seen gradual erosion in its authority to 
determine licensing conditions (Sensiba 1999a). First, Congress and the courts have required 
modified procedural requirements to assure greater attention to environmental consequences of 
licensing decisions (Spence 1999a; Sensiba 1999).   For instance, the 1986 Electric Consumers 
Protection Act required the FERC give equal consideration to wildlife and recreational outcomes 
and to accept resource agencies’ recommendations or to explain in writing why it was rejecting 
the recommendations.  The authority of state and federal agencies to insert conditions into a 
license over the objections of FERC was also strengthened (called “mandatory conditioning 
authorities”).  The courts, for example, expanded state water quality agencies’ authority to specify downstream flow conditions under section 401 of the Clean Water Act as well as 
expanding authority of the U.S Department of Interior to proscribe fish passage facilities on 
existing facilities (Sensiba 1999).  Unlike FERC, state and federal agencies exercising their 
mandatory conditioning authority face no statutory obligation to balance environmental gains 
against hydropower. Instead , these agencies advocate for a single objective (ex. aquatic habitat) 
and performance measure (ex. Dissolved oxygen at X concentration).    
The changes facilitated the ability of other interests to assert their conditioning authority 
in the relicensing process.  The number of mitigation alternatives offered by agencies for each 
license increased over time (Moore et al 2001; USGAO 1992).  Not surprisingly, the license 
process became more costly and conflict-ridden (Giovando 2000; Powell 1997).  Consequently, 
the time to process a relicense request increased considerably, from a little less than a year in the 
early 1980s to over 4 years by the mid 1990s (Hunt and Hunt 1997).  
By the mid 1990s, FERC’s traditional licensing process was becoming increasingly 
unacceptable to the FERC itself, as well  as to the applicants and the resource agencies  
(Stephenson 2000).  Even while they were increasing their influence in the licensing process, 
federal and state resource agencies and environmental groups remained critical of licensing 
conditions that reflected FERCs balancing of interests, as opposed to serving the more narrow 
objectives of the resource agencies. As federal/state agencies and nongovernmental groups kept 
resisting FERC, and as court challenges increased in number, the hydropower industry became 
increasingly concerned about time and cost required to secure a license renewal.   
FERC Hydro Licensing Reform, 1997-2004. 
The widespread dissatisfaction with the relicensing process led to reform proposals 
ranging from calls for different analytical methods to legislative changes to the balancing language of the Federal Power Act itself (Stephenson 2000).  In 1997 FERC made an initial 
effort to address these criticism by developing and experimenting with an “alternative” licensing 
process (referred to as the ALP process) (18 C.F.R. § 4.24(i) 2000). The alternative relicensing 
process retains the same two stage pre-filing and post-filing licensing process as the traditional 
process, but front loads the pre-filing process with early negotiation and collaboration between 
the license applicant and involved stakeholders (Powers 2004; Hill and Murphy 2003; Swant 
2001; Bonham 1999; Groves and Liimatainen 1999; National Hydropower Association 1999).  
 Under the ALP, the licensee must file a request to use the alternative process and before 
granting the request, the licensee must demonstrate to the FERC that the relevant stakeholders 
have been contacted, will participate in the process and the must have an acceptable 
communications protocol (National Hydropower Association 1999).  If approved, the licensee 
then establishes a collaborative process to investigate and discuss licensing alternatives.  The 
licensee works with the stakeholders to decide what studies will be conducted.  In addition, 
NEPA document preparation is moved into the pre-application phase where the applicant and 
stakeholders, not FERC, are largely responsible for preparing a draft NEPA document and a 
license application (National Hydropower Association 1999).  FERC staff are actively engaged 
in facilitating, not directing, the pre-filing discussions (Hill and Murphy 2003).   
  At the time the license renewal application is filed, FERC staff also receive a draft NEPA 
document and license application jointly submitted by the license applicant, resource agencies, 
Tribes, environmental groups, and other interested stakeholders.  FERC then produces a final 
EIS and license recommendations.  The presumption is that if all interested parties to the 
negotiation can agree on a mutually satisfactory license conditions and such conditions are 
within FERCs authority to confer, the FERC will translate these conditions into a new license.  As a practical matter, the alternative process decentralizes decision making by downplaying the 
role of the FERC staff and commissioners in judging whether the cost imposed by a license 
condition is “worth” the environmental/recreational enhancements (Stephenson 2000).  The ALP 
process places more responsibility on the licensee and involved decision participants to negotiate 
license alternatives and decide what alternative is mutually acceptable. 
As the alternative licensing process was being tested, FERC and a number of federal 
agencies (Departments of Commerce, Interior, Energy, and Agriculture, Environmental 
Protection Agency, and Council of Environmental Quality) voluntarily formed an interagency 
task force (ITF) in the late 1990s to investigate ways to improve the licensing process (DeWitt 
and Ebrahim 2001). A steering committee initially divided into four workgroups:  Coordination 
of federal and state statutory and regulatory mandates; Review of ex parte regulations; 
Collaborative Process Issues; and Economic Analysis: Methods and Procedures.  
The economic analysis work group was tasked with reviewing FERC’s economic 
analyses to assure that the licensing process fostered analyses that reflected federal resource 
agencies missions and the concerns of nongovernmental environmental groups. The U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service commissioned a study to advise the agency on how economic analysis 
could improve FERC decision-making (Industrial Economics 1999; Loomis 2000).  More than 
half of the report was devoted to explaining and advocating the use of nonmarket valuation 
techniques in relicensing.  A few years earlier, a coalition of environmental groups (called the 
Hydropower Reform Coalition) commissioned another study to review and critique FERC’s 
economic analysis (Marcus 1997).  This report was also critical of elements of FERC’s analyses 
and advocated for the need to conduct more nonmarket valuation as a way to minimize FERC’s 
“subjective” valuations as it made tradeoffs.  Three years after forming, the Interagency task Force released seven final reports 
(DeWitt and Ebrahim 2001).
3  The seven reports dealt almost exclusively with government 
agency coordination and licensing procedural issues.  Notable by their absence were reports or 
recommendations on the use or role of economic analysis in relicensing.  In fact the economics 
workgroup was not mentioned at all in the final reports.  Although no reports were issued, the 
economics workgroup did meet and develop initial work tasks. The group divided their efforts 
into two phases (Heinz 2000).  A Phase 1 report was descriptive in nature, cataloguing the type 
of economic analyses conducted by the different agencies and the types of methods that could be 
used to monetize the various market and nonmarket services that might be involved hydropower 
relicensing.  Drafts of this report were produced, but not released.  Phase II report was intended 
to be a consensus on what type of analyses ought to be done.  No consensus could be reached on 
the Phase II report (Heinz 2000).    
After the ITC reports were issued, investigations into the licensing improvement 
continued.  Two major efforts, the Interagency Hydropower Committee (IHC) and the National 
Review Group (NRG) ran in parallel.  The IHC was comprised of the same agencies that formed 
the Interagency Hydropower Committee (IHC).  Formed in July 2001, the goal of the IHC was to 
two fold. First, the IHC would monitor the use of the ITF recommendations.  Second, the IHC 
would investigate and make as necessary further recommendations for improving the licensing 
process (Hill and Murphy 2003, 40). The National Review Group (NRG) was lead by the Energy 
Policy Research Institute.  Made up of representatives from the hydro industry and conservation 
                                                 
3 The seven reports were: Guidelines to Consider for Participating in the Alternative License Process Agency 
Recommendations; Conditions, Prescriptions under FPA; NEPA procedures in FERC relicensing; FERC Noticing 
Procedures; Improving the Studies Process in FERC Licensing; Improving Coordination of Endangered Species Act 
Section 7; Tracking and Enforcing License Conditions 
 organizations they aimed to investigate and report on voluntary practices that might improve the 
relicensing process (Hill and Murphy 2003;  DeWitt and Ebrahim 2001).  
Both the IHG and the NRG published reform proposals in 2002 (Hill and Murphy 2003, 
40).  The type and use of economic analysis in the licensing process was not a substantial part of 
these efforts and did not appear in the recommendations.  The recommendations from each group 
were similar and tended toward procedural recommendations and modifications that built on the 
ITC recommendations (Hill and Murphy 2003; Swiger and Hill 2003). The reasons why 
analytical guidelines or recommendations, especially as related to the use of nonmarket 
valuation, were not included in these reforms is not part of the official record. However, during 
interviews with FERC staff, the following reasons for the failure to endorse non market valuation 
were offered.  Comprehensive benefit-cost analysis as it was advocated would purport to identify 
through computational analysis the single best alternative.  Requiring FERC staff to conduct 
such analysis was viewed as usurping the Congressionally delegated authority of the 
Commissioners to decide among alternatives. Supporting this concern was the perception that 
nonmarket valuation studies yield highly variable measurements of people’s preferences and that 
different study techniques or methods of the same environmental service will not yield consistent 
or reliable estimates. In that case, extended debate over methods would further extend the time to 
decision by creating an additional controversy among the various parties affected by the license 
(EPRI 2000).  In effect, the studies were not viewed as a practical or acceptable substitute for the 
statutory requirement that the Commissioners exercise their judgment to establish what decisions 
served the public interest.    
The ongoing deliberations between the ITF, IHG, and NRG contributed to the 
development of a third licensing process in 2003, called the Integrated Licensing Process (FERC Order No. 2002, July 2003).  Conceptually, the integrated licensing process is an elaboration of 
the alternative process (Swiger and Grant 2004).  Like the alternative process, the integrated 
process stresses and supports collaboration early in the relicensing process (re-filing stage), but 
adds a number of schedules/timelines and dispute resolution provisions (for example a close 
ended process to settle any pre-application study disputes).  In 2005 the ILP process became the 
default licensing process, officially replacing the traditional process.   
  In sum, FERC’s efforts to respond to the challenges and criticisms to the lack of attention to 
environmental outcomes in licensing choices was one of revising agency level rules governing the 
process of making licensing decisions.  The overwhelming focus and attention of the extensive 
revision of the licensing rules was on how to design processes that placed more responsibility on the 
involved decision participants to more effectively negotiate a mutually acceptable license alternative.  
Despite initial efforts to examine the possibility, the new licensing process did not include any 
guidelines or preferences for what type of analysis decision participants would have use in order to 
develop a license. As with other forms of analysis, nonmarket valuation was not endorsed or 
encouraged. Instead, the kind of analyses used in any specific case was to be at the discretion of the 
negotiating parties. In the new licensing processes, the responsibility to decide what analyses to 
conduct is made collaboratively between the dam owner, resource agencies, and involved 
stakeholders. The question then becomes, “Do decision participants use limited analytical 
resources to conduct nonmarket valuation studies to illuminate and aid their deliberations and 
choices of license conditions?   
 
Use of Nonmarket Valuation under the New Relicensing Processes 
 
     To examine what type of analyses are being produced and then used in the collaborative 
relicensing process, a list of all cases settled under the alternative and integrated licensing 
processes through 2005 was obtained from FERC.  It is important to note that these were settled 
cases, meaning that all parties, including resource agencies and nongovernmental groups, were 
able to agree to the terms of the license based on the analyses that were completed. The list 
contains 35 cases, representing 46 different individual hydropower projects (or test cases prior to 
formal adoption of the rules) (see Table 1).
4  The Environmental Impact Statement/ 
Environmental Assessment (EIS/EA) and license order for each case were obtained from FERC 
records.  Since the EIS/EA documents are the statement of record for each case, the EIS/EA 
provides a reliable catalogue of the types of studies produced during a licensing case. 
  Each EIS/EA and license order was reviewed.  Studies listed in each EIS/EA were 
classified into 5 general categories:  hydropower analysis, incremental flow/aquatic habitat 
analysis, entrainment/fish passage analysis, recreational user day studies, and nonmarket 
valuation studies.  In relicensing cases, hydropower analysis typically is the estimated cost in 
terms of value of the electric power forgone from the existing license baseline for environmental 
or recreational improvements.  Incremental flow and aquatic habitat analysis constituted a broad 
category of analytical efforts to estimate the change in aquatic habitat or biological functioning 
that would occur due to changes in the timing, duration, or magnitude of different flow releases. 
Fish passage analysis includes any attempts to evaluate fish mortality through the dam (e.g. fish 
loss due to entrainment/impingement) and technical studies to evaluate success of passing fish 
around the dam.  Studies falling under the recreational user day classification were confined to 
efforts to either estimate the current or future use of recreational amenities at the project site or 
                                                 
4 Some cases involved more than one hydropower projects.  In these cases, FERC processed these hydropower 
projects in the same watershed and operated by the same owner as a group. the estimate the cost to provide or enhance an amenity. For purposes here, recreational user 
studies do not include any attempts to monetize the value of that use.  Nonmarket valuation 
includes any monetization of preferences for recreational or aquatic service enhancements.  
A summary of the types of studies produced in the 35 settled cases are shown in Table 1.  
The types of analysis listed in the NEPA documents and license order were broadly similar to the 
types of analyses produced under the traditional analysis.  Every alternative licensing contained 
some type of financial cost analysis of foregone power, but in many cases the estimates of 
foregone power benefits seemed perfunctory.  Many cases contained cost/use estimates of 
various recreational enhancements or the cost of fish passage alternatives. Participants in the 
collaborative negotiation processes devoted the majority of analytical resources to estimating the 
physical and behavioral outcomes of different mitigation alternatives.  Incremental stream flow 
and fish response studies were the most common type of analyses used by participants in these 
negotiations (30 out of 35 cases).  Although these studies differed dramatically in levels of 
sophistication, many relicensing cases seemed to be focused on identifying possible physical and 
biological responses to different licensing alternatives.  Half of all the cases reported estimates of 
current recreational use or predicted changes in recreational use from different licensing 
alternatives. These behavioral changes were reported as user days or subjective assessments of 
the quality of recreational experiences.   
Of the 35 cases settled under the new licensing rules, not one EIS, EA, or licensing order 
reported an environmental valuation study or estimate. There were no instances of any of the 
relicensing cases using formal benefit-cost analyses to decide between different licensing 
alternatives. This evidence suggests that participants in the new FERC relicensing process did not 
require the use of environmental benefit estimates in their collaborative decision-making. 
Participants did not elect to spend limited analytical resources to quantify the affected benefits and costs on a comparable monetary basis in order to decide between levels of instream flows and 
power generation.  
While FERC and license participants have failed to move toward more comprehensive 
benefit-cost analysis, the more collaborative decision processes have appeared to improve the 
processes.   Public statements of support for the new licensing processes come from a diverse set 
of groups, including the hydropower industry, environmental groups, and resource agencies 
(Groves and Liimatainen 1999, Swant 2001; Keil 2002, Wilson 2000, Richter et al. 2003; Richter 
et al 2005; Pearsall et al. 2005).  FERCs own assessment of the process also confirms that the 
time, cost, and level of conflict has diminished under the alternative licensing process (FERC 
2001).   
 
III. REFLECTIONS FOR POLICY ECONOMISTS 
 
Many environmental economists argue that money-equivalent measures of peoples’ 
preferences for environmental services are essential for comprehensive benefit cost analysis. In 
turn, they argue that only by aspiring to such a comprehensive analysis can decision makers be 
assured that all preferences are counted and socially appropriate tradeoffs made. In the case of 
FERC licensing process for example, Loomis and Feldman (1995, 97) state that “FERC is faced 
with trying to balance ‘apples and oranges.’  Benefit cost analysis provides a framework where 
all the relevant power and environmental values can be put in equivalent terms.”  A recent  
National Research Council report (2004, 32) on valuation reflects the same sentiment: “if an 
environmental policy decision involves a trade-off in the choice between providing one 
ecosystem service (such as a particular habitat or ecological service) and providing another good 
or service (such as agricultural output), then information about the relative values of these alternative goods and services (through nonmarket valuation) can lead to better-informed and 
more defensible choices (NRC, 32).”  
Most economists also recognize that not all values can be monetized. Nonetheless, the 
NRC report argues that the “use of the (imperfect) information about these values is preferable to 
not incorporating any information about ecosystem values into decision-making (i.e. ignoring 
them), since the latter effectively assigns a value of zero to all ecosystem services” (NRC p. 
242). An unstated assumption behind this quotation is that decision participants can only make 
trade-offs if the outcomes of different alternatives are expressed in a single denominator of 
dollars. The explicit assertion is that failure to monetize preferences for environmental services 
will result in ignoring these preferences when decisions are made (Costanza et al. 1996; Loomis 
et al. 2000; NRC 2004).   
However, the FERC hydropower licensing experience shows that even where there was 
an opportunity to use non market valuation in decision making, there was no demand for such 
valuation by decision participants. More importantly, the FERC experience denies the assertion 
that environmental values are ignored unless they are monetized.  Instead of mandating new 
computational requirements so the commissioners could make difficult tradeoff decisions, FERC 
instituted institutional changes encouraging dam owners, government resource agencies, and 
nongovernmental groups to negotiate mutually satisfactory license conditions, that the 
commissioners would in turn endorse. This process is a substitute for valuation and for benefit 
cost analysis.  
To reflect all relevant values the FREC required that resource agencies, as well as 
nongovernmental groups such as property owner associations around a reservoir, whitewater 
boating groups, and environmental groups have access to the process equal to that of the dam owner. To assure that all values were considered FERC required that these groups bear a 
relatively low cost of participating in the process. To support the negotiations FERC required the 
dam owner to sponsor analyses of how different alternatives would affect metrics as diverse as 
power production, salmon numbers, recreational river use, and river flow regimes. The analyses 
allow decision participants to recognize the effects of a choice on financial outlays by the dam 
owner and the environmental and power production opportunities realized or forgone by all 
participants. With this multi-metric information, decision participants in dozens of cases have 
been able to consider different environmental changes in consideration of costs and agree on a 
license condition. That agreement was then reflected in new license conditions by the FERC 
commissioners, as long as the participation requirements of the non-traditional procedure were 
met.   
Securing agreement is compelling evidence that all values have been considered and 
acceptable tradeoffs made because no participant will agree to license conditions that would 
result in an outcome that would worsen their position.
5 And of note for this paper, we found no 
evidence that reaching agreement in the numerous cases reviewed required monetary expressions 
of preferences for all outcomes. Instead the revised licensing process assures that the positive 
value of environmental services is recognized and that trade-offs are considered.  
  
 
                                                 
5 In neoclassical terms, the new licensing processes establish a process for multiple decision participants to 
negotiating toward a contract curve. 
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P-1951  X X  X     
P-11243   X        
P-11393  X X       
P-2375 & 8277  X X  X     
P-1218  X   X     
P-2058  X X  X  X   
P-2609  X X  X  X   
P-420  X X       
P-11561  X X  X     
P-1980 et al  X X       
P-2035  X X       
P-2901 & 2902  X X       
P-2016  X X       
P-2077  X   X  X   
P-11834  X X  X     
P-271  X X  X     
P-346  X     X   
P- 2364 & 2365  X X  X     
P- 2000  X X  X     
P-1354  X X    X   
P-201  X X    X   
P-11588  X X       
P-2009  X X  X  X   
P-2852  X X       
P-469  X X       
P-309  X X       
P-11659  X X  X     
P-12379  X X       
P-477  X X  X  X   
P-2177  X X  X  X   
P-487  X X  X     
P-2169  X X  X     
P-632  X        
P-2586  X X       
P-2233  X X  X  X   
Summary  35/35 30/35  18/35  10/35  0/35 
*Analysis reported in EIS/EA case documents. 
 
 